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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-CONTRACT, NOT TORT, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN ACTION FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY FOR PARTICULAR

APPLICABLE

USE.
Plaintiff sustained personal injuries in October, 1965, when struck by
a glass door manufactured and installed in 1958 by Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. for Central Trust Co. of Rochester. Suit was commenced against Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Central Trust in 1965 alleging two causes of action
in negligence and two causes of action for breach of implied warranty. The
warranty actions were dismissed as to both defendants by Special Term.1
The appellate division 2 affirmed as to Pittsburgh Plate Glass, holding that
a cause of action alleging breach of warranty is governed by section 213 of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules which requires that, "an action upon a
contractual obligation or liability, express or implied," 3 must be commenced
within six years. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a vote of 4-3, refusing
to apply the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Held, a cause of action alleging
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular use is contractual, rather
than tortious in nature, and the six year statute of limitations4 commencing
on the date of sale bars this action. Mendel v. Pittsburgk Plate Glass Co., 25
N.Y. 2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
The instant case is an example of how the law has often been hampered
by the necessity of making the tenuous distinction between tort and contract
actions. 5 The characterization is often required in order to resolve the procedural problems of applying the proper statute of limitations,6 the correct
measure of damages and the permissible defenses. 7 Traditional judicial standards
8
which deal with this problem have created the distinction between nonfeasance
9
and misfeasance as guides to determine whether a cause of action is essentially
in tort or in contract in circumstances where warranty is not an issue. These
0
standards have led the courts to look to the gravamen of the particular action.'
1.
2.
3.
4.

57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
29 A.D.2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d 186 (4th Dep't 1968).
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 213(2) (McKinney 1963) [hereinafter cited as CPLR].
Id.

5. W. PRosszz, The Borderland Between Tort and Contract, in SELECTErD ToPics oN
Tam LAw or TORTS 430 (1954). Professor Prosser scorns the distinction in that it has recomplicated the simplified codes of pleading by forcing the pleader to elect the proper theory
for recovery, a shortcoming which modem pleading has attempted to avoid.
6. See, e.g., Blessington v. McCrory Stores, Inc., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953);
Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 703 (1954).

7. The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are not available
in contract actions as a rule, but see Maiorino v. Weco Prods., 45 NJ. 570, 214 A.2d 18
(1965) which held the defense of contributory negligence is available for an action in
implied warranty.
8. W. PaossEa, supra note 5, at 387.
9. Id. at 402.
10. Id. at 429.
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Generally nonfeasance, or failure to perform on the contract, gives rise to a
cause of action in contract, whereas misfeasance gives rise to a claim in tort.
But at times even this delineation may be troublesome. 1 The complexity of
the issue is compounded when the additional element of warranty is introduced, for warranty, having developed out of tort, has become inseparable
from contract. Originally a warranty action was for breach of an imposed duty
in tort where the wrong was considered to be akin to misrepresentation and
similar to deceit. Mere affirmation of a fact made negligently or without
knowledge of its falsity gave rise to a cause of action in tort. Later decisions
held that assumpsit would lie for a breach of express warranty as a part of
the contract of sale leading to the close association between warranty and
contract. The historical development of warranty is presently reflected in commercial law, and to some extent in the law of product liability.1 2 Yet the
development of implied warranty, a relatively new concept, has led to some
confusion, and its application remains unsettled in product liability actions.
The issue generally turns on the nature of the duty owed to the plaintiff.
It is a contractural obligation as well as a duty imposed by law, not two distinct
duties but more precisely one encompassing duty, which demands that the product be fit for its intended use.' 3 Confusion arises when one attempts to separate
this one duty into two distinct categories (i.e., tort or contract), since the
distinction between an imposed legal duty and an implied warranty is more
apparent than real. 14
This tenuous distinction has generated an amorphous field of personal
injury law with respect to defective products inasmuch as variations of both
tort and contract rules have been inconsistently applied to a cause of action
for a breach of implied warranty.'r Currently there are three recognized theories
of recovery for injuries sustained as a result of a defective product: common
law negligence, breach of express or implied warranty, and strict liability in
tort. To recover in negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the defect was caused by the manufacturer's failure to comply with the necessary standard of care required to produce a safe product. The development
11.

E.g., Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. Cas. 84 (N.Y. 1809).

12. W. PRossER & B. Smrr, CASES AwD MlA Pazs ox TORTS 804 nn. 3 & 4 (4th ed.
1967).

13. See Note, 42 HARV. L. Rav. 414 (1929). See also, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,
So Mmnsz. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966): "Until 1962 warranty had held the field, and no court
proceeded on any other basis, although a good many of them had realized that this was a

new and different kind of 'warranty,' not arising out of or dependent upon any contract
but imposed by law, in tort, as a matter of policy." Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139
Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1947): "Liability in such cases is not based on negligence,

nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual warranty, but in the broad principle of
the public policy to protect human health and life."
14. Blessington v. McCrory Stores, Inc., 305 N.Y. 140, 147, 148, 111 N.E.2d 421, 423
(1953): "Since the common law duty and the implied contractual obligation, in such
situations, are one in the same, the suit, however labeled, is one in negligence, at least for

time limitation purposes."
15. Thornton, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract, 14 BROOKLyx L, REV. 196
(1948).
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of warranty liability dispensed with the necessity of showing fault, but, being
so closely associated with contract, demanded that the attendant rules of contract be applied. 16 Courts began to make numerous exceptions to these rules,
notably in the area of food and drug products cases where a nonpurchasing
party injured by the product was allowed to recover in contract on an agency
theory.' 7 Ultimately, the privity requirement was dispensed with's and an
implied warranty was held to run with the product to the purchaser and his
family and guests.' 9 This trend has found acceptance with products other than
food and drugs and has developed into the doctrine of strict liability in tort
recently adopted in many jurisdictions. 20 Warranty, express or implied, is not
an element of strict liability in tort, although it certainly was an influential
factor in its development. 2 1 Rather, recovery for personal injury under strict
liability is predicated upon proof that the product was defective when manufactured, and the defect was the proximate cause of a foreseeable injury.
As the instant case illustrates, the New York courts, by tenaciously maintaining the distinction between tort and contract in product liability litigation,
have complicated the application of statutes of limitation in cases dealing with
implied warranties. Where the courts have deemed the cause of action to be
essentially in tort,2 2 thereby treating a breach of implied warranty not as
a breach of the contractual obligation, but as a violation of a common law
duty, the three year statute of limitations has been applied and has been
held to commence on the date of injury.23 Alternatively, if the claim is considered
to be in contract, thus treating the breach of an implied warranty as a material
breach of the contract itself, or some statutorily imposed standard, 24 the six
year limitation has been applied 25 and has been held to run from the date of sale
of the product. 28 New York courts have generally subscribed to this latter
16. These include privity, reliance on an implied or express warranty, notice of breach,

and disclaimers.
17. See Mouren v. The Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 1 N.Y.2d 884, 136 N.E.2d 715,
154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956); Bowman v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 308 N.Y. 780, 125
N.E.2d 165 (1955); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 338, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
18. See Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
266 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960). Paossm, supra note 5, at 791.
19. See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961);
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].

20. In California, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Tools, 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 899 (1963).
21. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or ToRTs § 402(A), comment M at 355, 356 (1965).
22. See, e.g., Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Colonna
v. Rosedale Dairy, 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936); Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18
P.2d 199 (1933); Schlick v. N.Y. Dugan Bros., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct.

1940).
23.

CPLR § 214(5).

24. N.Y. PEns. PRoP. LAw § 96(1) (McKinney 1962).
25. CPLR § 213(2). As of 1962, § 2-725 of the U.C.C. authorized a four year statute
of limitations. See, e.g., Bort v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 58 Misc. 2d 889, 296 N.Y.S.2d 739
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
26. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d 707
(Sup. Ct. 1945); Citizens Utils. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184
N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
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approach2 7 as illustrated in Blessington v. McCrory Stores, Inc. 28 where the
court indicated that the breach of the implied warranty of merchantable
quality, having been imposed by statute, 29 is essentially an action in contract
and consequently entitled to the benefit of the six year statute. This rationale
might be partially based on the fact that the court was confronted with a
statute which authorized a three year limit for a personal injury action arising
out of negligence8 ° and a six year limitation for an action arising upon a contract. The action in that case had not been commenced within the three years
required and thus would have been barred. Faced with the issue of whether
the breach of warranty constituted an act of negligence within the three year
statute, or a breach of a contractual obligation, the court said that even though
the breach may be associated with a tortious act, "it is independent of negligence," and was thus governed by the six year statute of limitations.81 Until
Blessington, New York courts had decided similar cases on a substantially
different basis 3 2 The tort-contract distinction was not considered determinative
since the action, whether for personal injury or property damage, was explicitly
covered (or not covered) by the three year statute. The court in Blessington,
however, refused to follow this reasoning since these cases dealt with actions
in negligence, where the existence of the contract was merely incidental to
the true nature of the event which generated the injury. Although the court in
the instant case was not confronted with the issue of negligence, it nevertheless retained the rationale that implied warranty is essentially within the law
of contract.
The court's determination that a cause of action for breach of implied
warranty is contractual, thereby requiring application of the six year statute
of limitations commencing on the date of sale, will effectively limit the number
of claims that may be brought against a manufacturer of a defective product.
In refusing to approve strict liability in tort the majority indicated its belief
that a personal injury resulting from a defective product years after its manufacture is presumably caused by operation and maintenance rather than faulty
design or assembly. Thus, the court spared the manufacturer from defending
and the court from hearing many claims which may lack any substantial merit.
27. Schwartz v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1963); Munn v. Security Controls, Inc., 23 A.D.2d 813, 259 N.Y.S.2d 824 (4th Dep't
1965); Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., Inc., 11 A.D.2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (2d Dep't
1960); Bort v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 58 Misc. 2d 889, 296 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Wilsey v. Sam Maulkey Co., 56 Misc. 2d 480, 289 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; Outwater v.
Miller, 215 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
28. 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
29. N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 96(1) (McKinney 1962). U.C.C. § 2-314.
30. N.Y. Sess. Law 1936, ch. 558. Cf. CPLR § 214(5) which does not mention negligence.
31. Blessington v. McCrory Stores, Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 147, 111 N.E.2d 421, 423
(1953).
32. See, e.g., Webber v. Herkimer & M.R.R. Co., 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358 (1888);
Drooby v. Collins, 281 AD. 733, 117 N.Y.S.2d 905 (3d Dep't 1952); Buyer's v. Buffalo
Paint & Specialties, 199 Misc. 764, 99 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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Henceforth, unlike a cause of action in negligence, a manufacturer will be
subject to liability for a breach of warranty for a period of only six years
from the date of sale. Once this period has elapsed the injured plaintiff will
be forced to sue in negligence even though a valid claim in implied warranty
may exist.
The court considered the rationale of Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp.,33 as well as the reasoning of Blessington.34 In Goldberg, the Court of
Appeals held the manufacturer of a commercial aircraft liable where a faulty
altimeter was believed to be the cause of a fatal crash. The court based its
decision on the theory that the benefit of an implied warranty, albeit without
privity, runs to those persons whose use of the product is within the reasonable
contemplation of the manufacturer. The majority in the instant case postulated
that since Goldberg stood for the proposition that in the absence of privity
the cause of action which exists in favor of a stranger to the contract is one
for a breach of implied warranty, a contract action rather than a tort action
exists. The dissent strongly opposed this characterization of Goldberg and insisted that strict liability in tort was clearly approved in that case. Furthermore,
the dissenters asserted that the nature of the breach of warranty which existed
was more properly within the scope of strict liability rather than contract and
that this interpretation of Goldberg should be followed giving the plaintiff a
cause of action in tort with the consonant three year statute of limitations
35
beginning on the date of injury.
The argument raised by the appellant that the three year statute could
apply to third party strangers only, thereby giving the plaintiff a cause of
action in warranty and thus allowing the decision in Blessington to remain
undisturbed was rejected by the court. It was stated that such a rule would
raise the anomaly of giving greater rights to the stranger than to the immediate
purchaser. Where the purchaser's cause of action would lapse six years after
sale, the third party could sue in warranty up to three years subsequent to
the injury. The court noted that it would be impossible to remedy such a defect
for to establish a three year statute of limitations for all personal injury actions,
thereby overruling Blessington, would be contrary to the Legislature's intentions
embodied in the Uniform Commmercial Code.3 6 The dissent was not persuaded
by this reasoning; it was noted that the U.C.C. was all but irrelevant for it
reflects dated policies, even with its annual updating and review, in that tort
cases have been decided on more modern theories as distinguished from those
in sales law.37 Moreover, the failure to establish a three year statute would
33.
34.
35.
36.

12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
See W. PROSSER, Tim LAW oF ToRTs § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
See U.C.C. § 2-725.

37. E.g., doctrine of strict liability in tort, see Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 44
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) ; Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d.57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
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result in barring such warranty actions before they had accrued; the injury
may occur after the six year period had lapsed.
The majority further indicated that to establish a three year statute
for all personal injury actions would enable a plaintiff whose action was covered
by the U.C.C.3 8 to choose either a three year period or a four year period in
which to sue. The court opined that while strict liability in tort and implied
warranty are different ways of describing the same cause of action, requiring
the same elements of proof, it may be permissible to plead both as different
theories of recovery but it would be absurd to have two different statutes of
limitation applicable.
In holding that a breach of implied warranty is essentially a contract
action, the court seems to have selected a rationale that may well serve as a
stumbling block for future decisions in product liability litigation. Henceforth,
personal injury actions resulting from defective products can be based either
in negligence or breach of warranty, and while the instant case leaves the
existing rule of negligence undisturbed, it serves to curtail warranty actions
which may arise more than six years after the sale of the product. These
actions will be barred by the statute of limitations for warranty before they
accrue, relegating the plaintiff to proving negligence where none may ha(,e
originally existed. The court justified this decision by stating the policy which
presumes that injuries caused by a defective product many years after its
manufacture and sale generally result from operation and maintenance. The
court indicated its willingness to subscribe to this policy and presumption when
it stated that it would rather sacrifice a small number of meritorious claims
than open the floodgates to numerous unfounded suits.
Although the court chose to face the issue of implied warranty it should
have avoided it by applying the three year statute of limitations which expressly covers actions for "personal injury." 39 Contrary to the assertion that
such a rule would run counter to the U.C.C., some lower New York courts, 40
as well as courts in other jurisdictions governed by the U.C.C.41 have held
that the theory of pleading is indeterminative where the applicable statute
of limitations covers the essential nature of the action. In failing to apply
the clear meaning of the statute the court chose to rely on Blessington which,
although bearing a marked similarity on its facts, was at least partially based
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Wilsey v. Sam Maulkey Co., 56 Misc. 2d 480, 289 N.Y.S.2d 307
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
38. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-318.
39. CPLR § 214(5).
40. See, e.g., Webber v. Herkimer & M. St. & R. Co., 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358
(1888); Drooby v. Collins, 281 A.D. 733, 117 N.Y.S.2d 905 (3d Dep't 1952); Buyer's v.
Buffalo Paint & Specialties, 199 Misc. 764, 99 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1950); and especially
Wilsey v. Sam Maulkey Co., 56 Misc. 2d 480, 289 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1968) which not only
allowed a cause of action in strict liability in tort, but also applied the three year statute
of limitations from the date of injury.
41. See Annot., 1 AL.R. 1313 (1919), 157 A.L.R. 763 (1945), 37 A.L.R.2d 703 (1954),
4 A.L.R.3d 821 §§ 3-5 & 7b (1965).
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on a statute of limitations which expressly required the existence of negligence. 42 In the instant case, the statute speaks to "an action to recover damages
for personal injury" 43 and specifies no theory of pleading. Thus, whether the
action is in negligence or in warranty, it may be argued that such a characterization is indeterminative of the applicable limitation period.
Having embarked on a discussion of implied warranty without privity,
the court certainly could have adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort,
for it did indicate that there was no real difference between the two concepts.
The majority stated that the elements of proof were the same for both theories.
Although this characterization may be interpreted as an equivocation of terms
it is clear that the court was not willing to accept the doctrine of strict liability
in tort now being adopted in many jurisdictions. The policy reasons given for
the instant decision are quite different from those which underlie the strict
liability doctrine. There the burden of loss due to personal injury is on the
manufacturer who puts the product into the mainstream of consumer trade
44
and is in better position than the injured individual to sustain financial loss.
This rationale may be far more attractive than that adopted here, which may
limit more than just a small percentage of warranty claims. Although modern
manufacturing methods are generally reliable, mass production's assembly line
technique has produced products which do not always meet qualitative standards. It is not an uncommon practice for manufacturers to design products
with "built-in obsolescence." 45 Yet, even though these practices increase the
probability of injury to consumers, it appears that the policy espoused in the
instant case at least implicitly approves of these practices. Even more important,
the court establishes not a rebuttable presumption, but a conclusive presumption that such injury six years after sale is a result of operation and maintenance rather than defective manufacture or design. Thus, it may be argued
that the court has clearly chosen a policy quite favorable to manufacturers
in a time when consumer legislation of all sorts has been increasing.4 6 It would
thus appear that the court has chosen to protect those parties least in need
of such aid at the expense of those who deserve protection the most.
MILES KAVALLER
42. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942, ch. 851; see also text accompanying note 14'supra.
43. W. PRossER, supra note 5.
44. See policy reasons for decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusain, 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965); Rooney v. S. A. Healy, 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 338, 281 N.Y.S.2d 321
(1967).
45.

R. NADER, UNSAiE AT ANY SPEED (1965).

46. As to warranties for fitness, see U.C.C. § 2-313, warranties for merchantability
§ 2-314, § 2-318, N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 96 (McKinney 1962). As to sales contracts see
Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw, Art. 10 § 401 et seq.; Motor Vehicle
Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. Pans. PROP. LAW § 301 et seq.

